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Abstract This is a comment by the translator on the translation of Hans Kelsen’s 
‘On the Theory of Juridic Fictions. With special consideration of Vaihinger’s Phi-
losophy of the As-If’ (Chap. 1).
Vaihinger’s philosophy of the As-If is a work which is almost as famous as it is un-
read and the strong intuitive appeal of its programme—so very neatly expressed in 
its title—has not been appealing enough to generate a lasting debate or something 
of a heritage in the English-speaking world.1 However, Kelsen’s early engagement 
with this work is still relevant and should attract our attention. This is so not only 
because of Kelsen’s comments on the concept of juridic fiction, but also because 
in this work Kelsen sketches out, and be it en passant, early ideas on freedom, nor-
mativity and the relation of law and morality. In this early discussion of his ideas 
we can see themes evolve which are central to the Pure Theory albeit not yet over-
burdened by the discourse of the basic norm.2
Apart from a respectful but largely critical analysis of Vaihinger’s use of juridic 
fictions, to which I will turn in a moment, Kelsen also makes two important points 
not trivially related to the question of juridic fictions. Kelsen claims, firstly, that 
the concept of the freedom of the will with all its metaphysical confusions is an 
unnecessary consequence of an insufficient separation of the realm of the is and the 
1 Being a commentary on Kelsen’s essay, this is not the place to discuss Vaihinger’s work in any 
detail. It has to suffice to say that it is a surprisingly erudite work, rich in detail which mainly suf-
fers from a repetitive urge to subsume everything under the construct of the fiction and to claim 
that all problems of philosophy can be solved thereby. Vaihinger is convinced the fiction is the key 
to a mediation between the actual and the ideal, a mediation which he calls “idealistic positivism” 
and which turns out to be a thoroughly un-dialectical assemblage of disparate and incompatible 
elements. He is drawn to the fiction because in it he believes to have found a construct that al-
lows us to continue to talk about the phantasies and dreamt up concepts we hold so dearly, yet 
still remain devoted to cognition of the actual world. It is thus a theory which promises to allow 
us to eat the cake, yet at the same time have it. Philosophically Vaihinger’s work is a combination 
of voluntarism, naturalism, Nietzscheanism, pragmatism and a reading of Kant along the lines of 
pragmatism.
2 On the misunderstood role of the Basic Norm, see Jestaedt 2013.
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realm of the ought and that as soon as one accepts this separation, the concept of 
freedom becomes superfluous; he claims, secondly, that the law can only ever be 
an object of cognition if it is understood as a sovereign normative order not derived 
from morality or religion and that, accordingly, law and morality cannot stand in 
any relation to each other, because they are not realms of actuality.
But let us start with the fictions themselves. According to Kelsen, Vaihinger is 
right in his general characterization of them. They are very peculiar intellectual 
constructs: they help us gain a better understanding of the world, but they do that by 
making claims about the world which are in clear opposition to facts or are plainly 
self-contradictory. For instance, in mathematics we make regular and expedient use 
of the concept of the “infinitely small”, despite it being clear that there is nothing 
in the world which is actually infinitely small and that the concept of something 
being infinitely small yet not being nothing, is self-contradictory; the same holds 
true for imaginary numbers (the square root of negatives); ditto for concepts like 
“matter”, “force”, and so on.3 In a fiction we treat X as if it were a Y in order to 
better understand the world, even though we very well know that X actually is not 
Y or cannot be Y.
From this Vaihinger develops the four main characteristics of fictions: (1) they 
include a contradiction with reality or a self-contradiction, (2) the fiction has to be 
fundamentally provisional, i.e. it has to disappear later on or be logically elimi-
nated, (3) the awareness of the fictivity has to be expressly stated, and (4) the fiction 
has to be expedient.4
So far so good. However, Vaihinger states that it was only in mathematics and 
in the law that fictions have so far been systematically discussed,5 and goes on to 
elaborate his understanding of the use of fictions in the law. And it is precisely 
this to which Kelsen takes exception. He claims that on close inspection nearly all 
the examples Vaihinger uses to illustrate juridic fictions cannot count as fictions in 
Vaihinger’s own sense. After all, Vaihinger quite naively talks about the “fictions 
of the law” and does not distinguish between the various possible authors of fic-
tions, i.e. between who exactly makes the fictitious statement. According to Kelsen, 
Vaihinger refers to at least three possible authors: the legislature, the judiciary (and 
other agents applying the law) and legal science. Now, of these three, only the latter 
can be said to satisfy all four of Vaihinger’s own characteristics of fictions.
(A) Fictions of the legislator, e.g. cases where the legislator decrees “that goods 
not returned to the sender within the proper time are regarded as if the recipient 
had definitely authorised and accepted them”6 cannot count as proper fictions as by 
3 Vaihinger actually ends up arguing that nearly every concept is a fiction. In the 800 pages of his 
work there seems to be no linguistic construct which he thinks would not benefit from being un-
derstood as a fiction. After all he says that every abstract and every general term is a fiction. Now, 
since every term, even an indexical, has an element of generality, according to Vaihinger every 
term must have a fictional element. This, however, is clearly proving too much as this generality 
robs fictions of any explanatory power.
4 Vaihinger (1924, p. 97).
5 Vaihinger (1924, p. 33).
6 Vaihinger (1924, p. 35).
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means of them the legislator does not attempt to facilitate knowledge of the actual 
world and they do not set up an explicit contradiction to the actual world. Legisla-
tive acts are acts of will, and as such they do not intend to represent knowledge of 
anything. What is more, a legislative act cannot set itself in contradiction to actual-
ity (which it does not even intend to represent). All it does is create a normative 
reality. So when the legislator says that A is to be treated as if it were a B, then by 
that he is not asking us to treat A as B in order to better know A, even though we 
know A not to be B. Rather, the legislative act normatively makes A a B. This means 
that the same normative consequences which are attached to B are by means of this 
“fiction” also attached to A. The legislator does not ask us to treat A “as if” it was a 
B, but he asks us to treat A “just as” B. Rather than being “fictions” in Vaihinger’s 
sense these constructs are only a convenient way of legislating, they are mere regu-
lative shortcuts.
There can be little doubt that Kelsen is correct here. Whether he has made more 
than a terminological point, and whether he ever intended more, remains, however, 
doubtful. What nevertheless warrants comment is the fact that since Kelsen has not 
yet incorporated Merkl’s doctrine of the “double-headedness of the legal act”,7 he 
did not yet seem to appreciate the fact that there can be no difference in principle 
between legislation and adjudication, since both apply existing law and create new 
law.
(B) In contrast, the fictions of the application of the law, e.g. fictions used by a 
judge to treat a case which is explicitly not covered by a statute as if it were covered 
by a statute, might satisfy the “cognition requirement” in that as a subaltern element 
the application of law involves a cognitive element in relation to the law which is 
applied; however, what this supposed “fiction” lacks is expediency, since, accord-
ing to Kelsen, these “fictions” cannot reach a correct conclusion. They cannot reach 
a correct conclusion, Kelsen claims, since as concerns the cognition of the law, only 
the law itself can be the standard of correctness. Now, adjudicative “fictions” do not 
simply provisionally treat cases as if they were different, but they permanently alter 
the legal material, thus violating criterion (2) and (4) of Vaihinger’s above stated 
characteristics of fictions.
Kelsen is correct, as long as we presuppose the truth of positivism, i.e. as long as 
we accept that the law includes only positive norms and not some interpretative ele-
ments. However, Kelsen himself seems aware of the limitation of his position as he 
concedes that since juridic fictions are ultimately indistinguishable from analogical 
interpretations, they have to be accepted as legitimate insofar as the legislator him-
self allows for the latter or insofar as they are warranted by means of customary law 
or a “natural principle of law”.8 If that is the case, however, then it is doubtful how 
much Kelsen has actually shown in his discussion of the fictions of the application 
of law. It is generally unclear if the big problems of interpretation and the filling of 
legal gaps can be adequately discussed under the heading of juridic fictions.
7 Merkl (1918).
8 See Kelsen, Chap. 1 above, p. 16.
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However, Kelsen’s treatment of the fictions of the application of the law faces 
another challenge, one similar to the one faced by the legislative fiction: after all, 
just as legislation has also an element of the application of (constitutional) law, 
so adjudication has an element of creation of law. In that sense the “fictions” of 
adjudication cannot be true fictions at all, since the judge in his judgment not only 
applies law, but also creates new law and the same logic of legislative “fiction” ap-
plies. Now, whereas Kelsen is aware of this legislative function of judges when he 
talks about the Roman Praetor being a legislative organ,9 he does not take this into 
consideration when dealing with fictions of the application of law.
(C) So the only legitimate fictions are the fictions of legal theory itself, i.e. the 
fictions used by legal science to better understand the law. So, for instance, Kelsen 
takes the legal subject and the legal person (including the legal person of the state)10 
to be but a personification or hypostatisation of a complex of norms which is ef-
fected by legal theory in order to better understand and handle this complex of 
norms. According to Kelsen there is no actual bearer of legal rights and duties out 
there in the world. Rather the legal subject is a construct. The fiction is created for 
the purpose of simplification and illustration and it becomes an error only when we 
mistake it to not be a mere (provisional and counterfactual) fiction, but a hypothesis 
or even dogma about the actual world.
(D) Let us now turn to Kelsen’s discussion of freedom. Here Kelsen presents 
an argument he will take up again in his Allgemeine Staatslehre and according to 
which the concept of the freedom of the will is mainly the result of a profound con-
fusion. Freedom is certainly not a fiction in Kelsen’s view. It is a mistaken solution 
to a pseudo-problem that emerges from the insufficient distinction of the realms of 
the is and the ought. As soon as we sufficiently distinguish between the realms of 
the is and the ought, the need for freedom of will withers away:
Only if one ignores the difference between is and ought (as two distinct forms of cogni-
tions) and takes the possibility of being actual as a condition of an ought-statement, only 
then the illusion is created that there existed a contradiction between the statement, which 
posits that something ought to be, and the statement, which claims as a matter of fact that 
this something is actually impossible; only then the following error emerges: that a certain 
content (the action which ought to occur) has to be actually possible, the actor thus has 
to be feigned to be free, in order to make possible the statement of ought, and thereby to 
simultaneously make possible the duty to act and maybe even the duty to act differently 
than one actually acts, differently than one actually must or can act. A methodological error 
leads to the fiction of freedom, which becomes superfluous as soon as one acknowledges 
this error. This is the only way to explain the curious fact that a strict opposition between the 
freedom within ethics and jurisprudence, on the one hand, and the un-freedom within natu-
ral science, on the other, could emerge, yet could at the same time be ignored by both sides. 
The ethical fiction of freedom thus is useful and necessary only as long as the adequate 
methodological insight is absent.11
9 See Kelsen, Chap. 1 above, p. 13.
10 For a discussion of Kelsen’s treatment of legal persons see Paulson (1998). It is unfortunate that 
Paulson does not refer to Kelsen’s fiction paper.
11 See Kelsen, Chap. 1 above, p. 17.
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Freedom seems necessary only if we claim that the statement
1. A ought to φ
can be true only if12 the statement
2. A actually can φ
is true. Now, Kelsen’s argument simply is that an ought statement cannot be con-
ditioned by an is statement. For Kelsen (1) cannot have as its necessary condition 
(2), as normative and factual statements cannot stand in any logical relation to each 
other whatsoever. They can not contradict each other and they cannot condition 
each other. The absence of the relation of implication can be seen from the fact that 
(1) does not contradict
3. A actually cannot φ
Now, to claim that (1) implies (2) means that (1) cannot be true without (2) being 
true. But this, according to Kelsen, can only be the case if (3) conflicted with (1), 
which, according to Kelsen, it does not. “Peter ought to be nice” does not conflict 
with “Peter is not nice”. Nor does it conflict with “Peter cannot ever be nice” or 
“Peter is not free to be nice”. But if “Peter ought to be nice” does not conflict with 
“Peter is not free to be nice” then it is hard to see how “Peter ought to be nice” could 
ever presuppose “Peter is free to be nice”.
The point Kelsen is making is simply that the existence of freedom, which would 
be a fact, cannot ever be derived from the statement of a norm.
However, Kelsen thinks that even if we make the Kantian assumption that the 
natural world is fully determined causally, and that there is no place for freedom, 
there is still a point of talking about the ought. The normative realm can do well 
without freedom the concept of freedom is the result of a misunderstanding of the 
normative realm as having a logical relation to the actual realm.
According to Kelsen the statement “Peter ought to be nice” makes sense even 
when we do not attribute a magical quality of being able to suspend causation to Pe-
ter, just as it makes sense to state “The coffee ought to be hotter” without attributing 
any such quality to the coffee. Of course, one might argue that “The coffee ought 
to be hotter” only makes sense if understood as “Someone ought to have made the 
coffee hotter”. But, this begs the question as then again we could ask whether this 
someone, who supposedly ought to have made the coffee hotter, was actually in a 
position to have been able to make the coffee hotter.
The point Kelsen is making is that we do not need freedom to make sense of 
ought statements. Ought cannot and does not need to be analysed in terms of free-
dom, it is rather itself fundamental. We know what we mean by “Peter ought to be 
nice”, “The coffee ought to be hotter”, “Brutus ought not have killed Caesar” and 
this understanding does not presuppose freedom of will. This Kelsenian view, of 
course, sits much more comfortably with a non-cognitivist, expressivist or emotivist 
12 The relation here is the relation of simple implication: (1) → (2) making (2) a necessary but not 
a sufficient condition of (1).
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meta-ethical commitment, which takes the above statements to mean: “Peter is not 
nice, but I’d prefer if he was”, “The coffee is not hot, but I’d prefer if it was”, and 
“Brutus did kill Caesar, but I’d prefer if he had not” and thus takes ought-statements 
as expressions of desires and not of beliefs. This again shows that despite claims to 
the contrary Kelsen in his fundamental normative convictions might be much closer 
to Hume than to Kant.
(E) The second theme that Kelsen discusses en passant his debate of juridical 
fictions is the epistemological constitution of the object of legal science, i.e. the 
understanding that the sovereignty of the law is a necessary epistemological presup-
position of legal science. This theme will later move more to the centre of Kelsen’s 
legal theory and turn out to be one of the foundations of the Pure Theory of Law. 
Here, in contrast to the above discussion, we can find strong Kantian allusions:
After all, legal science—as cognition of a particular object—can only be possible if one 
assumes the sovereignty of the law (or, which is the same, of the state), i.e. if one takes 
the legal order as an independent system of norms which is not dependent on any higher 
order. Otherwise only a moral science (ethics) or theology would be possible, depending on 
whether one takes the law to be a result of morality or religion. (As long as we consider the 
law to be an order, a complex of norms, we do not need to consider here a possible natural 
science or sociology of law, which clearly would also have to be considered a science of 
law).13
In this statement we can find neatly encapsulated many themes Kelsen will develop 
further later on: the separation of law and morality as a condition of legal science, 
the distinction of the legal order as a normative order from other possible objects of 
empirical sciences, and the sovereignty of the law as an overspill of an epistemo-
logical requirement into the quality of the law itself.
What follows from this is that opposed to what Vaihinger claims, the separation 
of law and morality cannot be fictitious. Or, as Kelsen himself put it in exceptional 
clarity:
The relation of law and morality is in no sense a relation between two “realms of life” as 
two parts of natural reality. Their “actual” relation is no relation in actuality, i.e. in real-
ity which can be captured by natural science understood in the broadest sense and also 
including social sciences. The juridic perspective which Vaihinger accuses of committing 
a fictitious isolation, cannot depart from an integrated part of actuality, not even in deter-
mining the relation of its object to morality, since it does not even have actuality in view. 
However, insofar as law and morality are considered as—social—facts, as “actual” going-
ons in nature (and it remains an open question whether this is at all possible), they are not 
objects of specific juridic cognition, or of normative ethics. And in this sense the related 
fictitious isolation cannot take place at all. There is no need for it at all. For an inquiry of 
the actuality of the so-called experience of law, of the factual moral ideas and the “moral” 
actions effected by them—its methodological possibility simply assumed—law and moral-
ity are something completely different than what these two same words denote as objects of 
normative legal science and ethics.14
Kelsen’s engagement with Vaihinger’s theory of fictions is an early text which de-
spite suffering from some defects, like the language in places being laboured and 
13 See Kelsen, Chap. 1 above, p. 18.
14 See Kelsen, Chap. 1 above, p. 19.
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stilted, or Kelsen not yet having fully found his elegant voice and intellectual vo-
cabulary, surprises in many passages with deep insights and fresh formulations still 
unburdened by his later systematic endeavours.
References
Hans Kelsen. 2014. On the theory of juridic fictions. With special consideration of Vaihinger’s 
Philosophy of the as-if. In  Legal fictions in theory and practice, ed. Maksymilian Del Mar and 
William Twining. Dordrecht: Springer.
Jestaedt, Matthias. 2013. Geltung des systems und Geltung im system. Wozu man die Grundnorm 
benötigt—und wozu nicht. Juristen Zeitung 21:1009–1021.
Merkl, Adolf. 1918. Das doppelte Rechtsantlitz. Juristische Blätter 57:425–427.
Paulson, Stanley L. 1998. Two problems in Hans Kelsen’s legal philosophy. In Pragmatism, rea-
son and norms. A realistic assessment, ed. Kenneth R. Westphal, 219–242. New York: Ford-
ham University Press.
Vaihinger, Hans. 1924. The philosophy of ‘As-If’. A system of the theoretical, practical and reli-
gious fictions of mankind. Trans. C. K. Ogden. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.
christoph.kletzer@kcl.ac.uk
